Public Funding of Private Education: A Public Policy Analysis;Note by Conway, Shawn C. et al.
Journal of Legislation
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 7
1-1-1983






Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Conway, Shawn C.; Camiña, Ophelia S.; Bettinger, Michael J.; and Casey, Robert G. (1983) "Public Funding of Private Education: A
Public Policy Analysis;Note," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 10: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol10/iss1/7
NOTES
PUBLIC FUNDING OF PRIVATE EDUCATION: A
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS
The United States Congress has long placed a priority on the educa-
tion of United States citizenry. Similarly, state legislators have long
placed a priority on the education of state residents. Private elemen-
tary and secondary schools, however, have traditionally received little
federal or state attention.' Only with the recent interest in public fund-
ing of private education, have Congress and state legislators begun to
consider the plight of private elementary and secondary schools. At
present, the National Center for Education Statistics has commissioned
James Coleman, in a major longitudinal study, to compare public and
private schools.2 Finally, private education will gain a seat at federal
and state governments' policy making tables.
Short- and long-term trends explain the increasing interest in pri-
vate education within the United States. Important shifts in family
size, composition, and income level impact upon family educational
choices. Postponed childbearing and fewer family members result in
more disposable income available for education. Moreover, an abiding
belief in the importance of education motivates many parents to pro-
vide their children with a "good" education.
The principle form of public support for private education remains
embedded in tax codes. At the state and local levels, private schools
1. For purposes of this note, the term private will include all non-public elementary and secon-
dary schools which charge a tuition fee.
2. The first Coleman report was authorized by Congress, in conjunction with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as a survey of equality of educational opportunity. Released in 1966, the report
offered no policy recommendations. Its findings, however, became the source of a number of
important school policies. The report found that racial segregation was extensive; that the
differences in resources between black schools and white schools were not as great as had
been anticipated; that levels of achievement for minority pupils were lower at every level of
schooling than those of white pupils; that schools are remarkably similar in the effect they
have on the achievement of their pupils when the socioeconomic background of the students
is taken into account; that variations in the facilities and curricula of the schools account for
relatively little variation in pupil achievement; that quality of teachers had some relationship
to pupil achievement, especially for minority pupils; and that the composition of the student
body had a strong relationship to the achievement of minority pupils. J. COLEMAN, EQUAL-
ITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21-23 (1966) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN, 1966].
The 1981 Coleman report, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS, is part of a major longitudinal
study called "High School and Beyond." The study was commissioned and financed by the
National Center for Educational Statistics, an arm of the Department of Education. The
new Coleman report dramatically reverses the pessimistic conclusions of the first Coleman
report and finds instead that schools do make a difference. The Coleman report of 1981 finds
that, after family background is taken into account, there remains significant variation in
student achievement and that this variation is related to differing educational policies.
3. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), does allow schools with concentra-
tions of low-income students to obtain federal funding for compensatory education pro-
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usually escape taxes on real property and improvements used for
school purposes, and pay no income, use, or sales taxes.4  Private
schools also enjoy "negative" transfer payments from the state and fed-
eral government. Negative transfer payments stimulate school reve-
nues by providing private schools the capacity to receive tax-free
donations.'
Religious instruction poses the major hurdle to further support for
private education. Most authorities on constitutional law agree that
public money may not be spent for private sectarian education.' The
conflict arises between the "free exercise" and "establishment" clauses
of the first amendment of the United States Constitution. The former
guarantees an individual's right to the free exercise of religion, while
the latter prohibits government action that might establish religion.' In
a wide variety of cases, courts have determined that various forms of
direct public aid violate the Constitution.8 The courts have struck
down direct payments to religious schools,9 as well as time-shared facil-
ities arrangements.' 0
This note will critically examine, from constitutional and public
policy perspectives, the issue of public funding of private elementary
and secondary education. This examination will be limited in scope to
private schools at the elementary and secondary level." The first part
of this note analyzes constitutional considerations and reviews previous
challenges to public funding of private education based on the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment. The second part of this note
analyzes the most prominent public policy arguments submitted for
and against public funding of private elementary and secondary
grams. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974),
Title I of the amended Act requires that students attending private schools, who qualify for
compensatory education, receive the same funding as their public school counterparts.
4. Although religious educational institutions enjoy no inherent exemption from taxation and
their property is taxable except so far as it is specifically exempted by constitutional or statu-
tory enactment, Animal Rescue League v. Bourne's Assessors, 310 Mass. 330,37 N.E.2d 1019
(1941), in a large number of states the property of religious institutions is exempted from
taxation by statute. The fundamental ground upon which the exemption is based is the
benefit conferred upon the public by such institutions and the consequent relief of the bur-
den imposed on the state to care for and advance the interest of its citizens. Congregational
Sunday School & Publishing Soc. v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108, 125 N.E. 7 (1919).
5. I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 1982).
6. See discussion on the cases constitutionally challenging the public funding of private schools,
infra notes 16 to 59 and accompanying text.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Committee for Public Education and Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Re-
gan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
9. Levitt 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Contra Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursement to parents for transportation costs to parochial
schools upheld).
10. Meek 421 U.S. 349 (1976); Woman 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Contra Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (loaning of textbooks free of charge to students in all private
schools upheld).
11. For purposes of this note, elementary education will include kindergarten and grades one
through eight. Secondary education will include grades nine through twelve.
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schools. The third part of this note will review various tuition-based
funding proposals at the federal level, including the tuition tax credit
proposal1 2 and the "Baby" BEOG proposal.' 3 The fourth part of this
note will review the tuition-based funding proposals at the state level;
including tax credit and deduction proposals' 4 and the tuition voucher
proposal.'5 The mechanics of each federal and state proposal will be
critically analyzed to determine, first, whether it meets the constitu-
tional hurdles and, second, whether it is good policy to promote these
proposals.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The initial inquiry in any consideration of the question of public
funding at sectarian schools involves the constitutional aspects of the
establishment clause of the United States Constitution. 16 The estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment 7 prohibits Congress as well as
the states'" from making any law respecting the establishment of reli-
gion. In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has been faced
with the task of applying this prohibition to increasingly creative at-
tempts by state legislatures to reduce the economic hardships of non-
public schools. This task has become even more difficult with the
erosion of the traditional distance between politics and religion. 9 Jus-
tice White, in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Regan ,20 stated that:
Establishment clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we
are divided among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on
this subject of the people of this country.2'
This observation explains the present state of constitutional law on this
issue.
Through thirty-five years and almost a dozen case decisions the
Court has chosen to sacrifice clarity and predictability for flexibility.22
As Justice White concedes, Regan does not furnish a litmus paper test
any more than past cases.23 The Supreme Court has, however, estab-
12. H.R. 12050, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 1095, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979); S. 550, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
13. S. 1101, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09(22) (West 1982); Washington, D.C. Initiative Measure No. 7,
Title VIII A, Educational Tax Credit for the November 3, 1981 general election, reprinted,
infra note 168.
15. Infra notes 180 to 199 and accompanying text.
16. The other religion clause of the first amendment, protecting the free exercise of religion, is
not pertinent to this discussion. As noted in Allen, 392 U.S. at 248-49 state aid challenges
based on the free exercise clause fail if they show no coercive effect of the law against an
individuars religious practice. See also Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. 7 provides that "Congress shall-make no law respecting the establish-
ment of religion ....
18. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
19. See, e.g., Once Again, School Prayer, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 28, 1981, at 49.
20. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).





lished and continues to apply a tripartite test applicable to all establish-
ment clause questions. The triparite test requires that a challenged
statute (1) have a secular legislative purpose, (2) have a principal or
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.24
Secular Legislative Purpose
Everson v. Board of Education laid the foundation for the first crite-
rion in the establishment test.25 Everson upheld public busing of paro-
chial school students, concluding that such busing provided a
legitimate safety measure similar to police and fire protection. The
next state aid case, Board of Education v. Allen ,26 transformed the con-
cept of a public welfare benefit into the secular legislation purpose cri-
terion. Lemon v. Kurtzman,28 then confirmed this broad view of
secular legislative purpose.29 In applying the purpose criterion, the
Lemon court simply accepted the stated legislative purpose "to en-
hance the quality of the secular education in all schools" and remarked
that "[t]here is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything
else."3 Later establishment clause cases have made similar cursory ex-
aminations reaffirming the states' legitimate legislative interest in the
secular education function of private sectarian schools. 31 Since Allen,
the secular purpose requirement has become a largely perfunctory in-
quiry easily satisfied,by any legislative recitation of purpose.
3 2
Since the court will essentially presume the requisite secular pur-
pose for any legislative enactment, the first criterion of the tripartite test
has become little more than a formality. The real test of establishment
clause scrutiny is found in the effect and entanglement inquiries.
24. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. This tripartite test is commonly referred to as the Lemon test.
25. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson was the first Supreme Court case to raise an establishment clause
challenge of a statute providing state aid to religious schools. The challenged statute author-
ized reimbursement to parents for transportation costs of children attending both public and
Catholic schools. The Court upheld the statute, concluding that it was a legitimate public
safety measure analogous to ordinary police and fire protection.
26. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
27. Id at 243. This criterion had already undergone significant elaboration in Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
The Allen Court found a secular purpose in a challenged textbook loan program that
"merely [made] available to all children the benefits of a general program," 392 U.S. at 243.
The Court went on, however, to declare that states have "a proper interest in the manner in
which [sectarian] schools perform their secular educational function," Id at 247. By ex-
panding the secular legislative purpose concept, the Court extended Everson's public welfare
rationale far beyond its original bases.
28. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29. Id at 613.
30. Id
31. See, eg., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773:
[Wie need touch only briefly on the requirement of a 'secular legislative purpose'.
As the recitation of legislative purposes appended to New York's law indicates, each
measure is adequately supported by legitimate, nonsectarian state interest. We do not
question the propriety, and fully secular content, of New York's interest in preserving
a healthy and safe educational environment for all its school children.
32. Indeed, the Court has invalidated no statute for lack of a secular purpose.
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Primary Effect
In Everson, the court also introduced the second requirement of the
tripartite test, that the primary effect of legislation may neither advance
nor inhibit religion. The Court stated that the first amendment "re-
quires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their ad-
versary."3 This general neutrality concept soon developed into a gen-
eral prohibition of the advancement or inhibition of religion.
34
In three early cases decided on the basis of the primary effect crite-
rion, the Court invalidated aid statutes that failed to assure that the aid
would be limited to secular activities. 35  By 1975 the Court refused to
allow direct aid, in the form of equipment and materials, to nonpublic
schools which "from [their] nature. . . [could] be diverted to religious
purposes. 36 Two years later, the Court retreated from this rule and
allowed state authorities to administer state aid programs off nonpublic
school sites.37 The Court, however, struck down any scheme which left
33. 330 U.S. at 18.
34. See Allen, 392 U.S., at 242-43:
Based on Everson, Zorach, McGowan, and other cases, Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), fashioned a test subscribed to by eight Justices for
distinguishing between forbidden involvements of state with religion and those con-
tacts which the Establishment Clause permits:
'The test may be stated as follows: what are the pu.rpose and the primary effect
of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitu-
tion. That is to say to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. Everson v. Board ofEducation ... .' 374 U.S. at 222.
35. In 1973, the Court decided three state aid cases all on the basis of the primary effect criterion.
The first significant development of this inquiry came with Levitt v. Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973), in which the Court invalidated a New
York statute providing reimbursement to nonpublic schools for performing state-mandated
tests. The statute neither attempted nor provided means to assure that teacher-prepared tests
were free of religious instruction. Therefore, the Court found a potential for advancement of
religion "because the aid that [would] be devoted to secular functions [was] not identifiable
and separate from aid to sectarian activities." Id at 480.
The Court found the same constitutional flaw in Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), (decided the same day). The statute in
Nyquist authorized state money grants to nonpublic schools for maintenance and repair of
facilities and equipment. The statute's failure to differentiate between facilities devoted to
religious activities and secular functions gave it the primary effect of advancing religion by
subsidizing religious activities of sectarian schools.
The final state aid case of the 1973 trilogy involved a Pennsylvania statute providing
funds to reimburse parents for tuition expenses of children in nonpublic schools, Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). The Court found no constitutional difference between this
program and the reimbursement scheme in Nyquist. The statute was held to violate the
establishment clause due to its effect of impermissibly advancing religion.
36. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (syllabus of the court). This flaw in the statute imper-
missibly advanced religion. In this case, the Court considered the secular educational func-
tion and religious mission of sectarian schools to be "inextricably intertwined." Id at 366.
For this reason, the program constituted "direct aid" which, as indicated in earlier cases, see,
e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780, results in an impermissible advancement of religion.
37. In Wolman, 433 U.S. 229, the Court upheld provisions of an Ohio statute authorizing the
purchase of secular textbooks, the supply of standardized testing and scoring services, and
the provision of diagnostic, therapeutic, guidance and other remedial service by public em-
ployees. These programs failed to advance religion because they were not administered on
the nonpublic school site and state authorities retained control. This development suggests
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significant control in private school officials.38 The Court reasoned that
such aid schemes contained the unacceptable risk of advancing
religion. 9
Most recently, the Court has rejected the "formalistic dichotomy"
of direct and indirect aid.40 In Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Regan,4" the Court indicated that it would no
longer invalidate a statute simply because the statute directed funding
to schools, rather than pupils or their parents.42 This dramatic rejec-
tion of prior dicta4 3 not only suggests a more lenient future application
of the effect criterion but also marks a much more permissive view of
the establishment clause in general.
Thus, in interpreting the establishment clause, the Court first dis-
tilled a concept of neutrality from the first amendment's "high and im-
pregnable" wall between church and state. The Court then translated
this neutrality as a prohibition of advancement of religion. Incidental
benefits to religion were allowed, however, provided the aid remained
"indirect." Gradually, the Court allowed more than "incidental" bene-
fits as long as state authorities retained control. Now the Court has
eroded the wall between church and state further by recanting its ear-
lier statements condemning direct aid.
Excessive Government Entanglement
The third prong of the establishment clause test, requiring that a
statute not result in excessive entanglement between government and
religion, in Walz v. Tax Commissioner developed' as an offshoot of the
secular purpose inquiry. The Court indicated that in addition to meet-
ing the secular purpose and primary effect requirements, a statute must
that aid to the secular educational function is not per se unconstitutional as Meek had
indicated.
38. Id
39. Provisions for instructional materials, equipment, and field trip transportation within the
same aid scheme did not withstand primary effect scrutiny. Although the statute limited
materials and equipment to those "incapable of diversion to religious use," Id at 248, the
Court determined the primary effect to be a direct and substantial advancement of sectarian
enterprises. The Court similarly indicated that "it would exault form over substance if [the
Ohio statute's distinction of issuing materials to the pupil rather than directly to the school]
were found to justify a result different from that in Meek." Id at 250. The field trip funding
provision left the determination of timing, frequency, and destination of trips in the control
of school officials. In the Court's view the nature of field trips and the integral role of the
teacher in making a trip meaningful produced an unacceptable risk of advancing religion.
40. Regan, 444 U.S. at 658.
41. Id at 646.
42. Began upheld the New York legislature's statutory response to the Levitt decision. The new
version of the reimbursement program for state-mandated testing now provided for stan-
dardized state-prepared tests and required schools to submit vouchers recording teacher time
spent.
43. See supra note 37.
44. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Walz involved a New York property tax exemption for religious orga-
nizations. The statute was challenged for indirectly contributing to religious bodies. As an
offshoot of its secular purpose inquiry, the Walz Court examined the government involve-
ment in religion arising from the statute, particularly the administrative relationships neces-
sary for enforcement.
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not give rise to excessive governmental involvement through "continu-
ing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement."'
In Lemon v. Kurtzman ,46 the Court applied this "entanglement" re-
quirement as a separate inquiry and developed its two components-
government surveillance and political divisiveness.47 While later cases
have minimized the importance of the political divisiveness compo-
nent,48 government surveillance has remained vital. As formulated in
Lemon, the government surveillance component focuses on three fac-
tors to determine whether entanglement becomes excessive: (1) the
character and purposes of the institutions benefitted, (2) the nature of
the aid provided, and (3) the resulting relationship between govern-
ment and the religious authority.49 The Lemon majority concluded
that the religious character and purpose of sectarian schools generally
gives rise to entanglement. Accordingly, the inevitable surveillance re-
quired to guard against mingling of religious activity and secular edu-
cation, through a salary supplement program for nonpublic teachers,
involved excessive and enduring entanglement.
Immediately after invalidating Lemon's salary supplement pro-
gram, the Court upheld a federal construction grant program for col-
lege facilities, observing that college students are less impressionable
and less susceptible to religious indoctrination than elementary and
secondary students.50 The Court reasoned that because religious indoc-
trination did not constitute a substantial purpose of the church-related
colleges, entanglement was minimal.51
45. Id at 675. The property tax exemption was upheld since, if anything, it tended to eliminate
the administrative relationships for tax violation, liens, and foreclosures.
46. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
47. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), a Rhode Island enactment providing a 15%
salary supplement for nonpublic school teachers was held to foster "excessive government
entanglement with religion." Id at 613. In reaching this decision, the Court elaborated that
entanglement's "line of separation, far from being a 'walL' is a blurred, indistinct, variable
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Id at 614.
48. The second component of Lemon's entanglement analysis explored the potential for political
divisiveness along religious lines. The Court emphasized that the threat of partisans voting
their faith was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect. Id at 623. The Court recognized that particular religions often take strong stands on
public issues. Nevertheless, it indicated that the Constitution prohibits laws benefitting rela-
tively few religions when, as in the salary supplement program at issue, they increase the
potential for political fragmentation through the need for annual appropriations decisions
likely to demand increasingly greater subsidization.
Since Lemon, the political diviseness question has been largely neglected by the Court in
state aid cases. It was considered in Nyqust, where the Court observed in the tax benefit
provisions a "grave potential for ... continuing political strife over aid to religion." 413
U.S. at 794. Essentially, the Court regarded the provisions as "foot-in-the-door" legislation
beginning at modest levels but subject to annual pressure for enlargement. Yet the Court
didn't base its decision on this prospect of divisiveness; it merely viewed it as a "warning
signal." Id at 798. In Meek, the Pennsylvania statute "create[d] a serious potential for divi-
sive conflict," 421 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added), but the Court did not fully discuss this
point. Finally, the majority opinions in the two most recent cases, Wolman and Regan, have
virtually ignored this aspect of the entanglement analysis.
49. 403 U.S. at 615.
50. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
51. Id at 681.
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The Court next invalidated a statute providing "auxiliary serv-
ices,"" focusing on the "pervasively religious" atmosphere in which
they were to be provided. 3 By contrast, in Wolman v. Walter, 54 the
Court upheld an aid program that required supervision only in a neu-
tral setting and granted no program control in nonpublic school
personnel.Y5
The Court in Regan56 found that state's control of test content and
the objective nature of the state mandated testing and scoring provi-
sions presented no difference of constitutional dimension from those
tests upheld in Meek v. Pittenger.57 In Regan, New York not only sup-
plied the tests but also reimbursed nonpublic schools for time spent
administering them. The Supreme Court agreed with the district
court's determination that the reimbursable services were "discrete and
clearly identifiable."58 The Court also concluded that the auditing and
reimbursement process, which were straightforward and susceptible to
typical routinization, created no excessive entanglement.
This examination of recent Supreme Court decisions provides the
framework within which to analyze a public funding of private elemen-
tary and secondary education proposal. Though the Supreme Court
appears to have broadly interpreted the tripartite test set forth in
Lemon, any state or federal funding proposal must satisfy, at least, the
test as interpreted in Regan .9
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The cost of education has increased drastically in the last decade.6°
Private elementary and secondary schools have responded by turning
to the public sector for financial assistance. As pressure builds for in-
52. "Auxiliary Services" means remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and
testing, and speech and hearing services.
53. In Meek, 421 U.S. 349, the degree of prophylactic contact necessary to ensure that subsidized
teachers did not inculcate religion gave rise to excessive entanglement. Although the need
for continuing surveillance was reduced by the fact that the auxiliary service teachers and
counselors were to be public employees, since the services were to be performed in the perva-
sively religious atmosphere of the sectarian schools, the resulting entanglement remained
excessive.
54. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
55. The Wolman aid scheme tailored its diagnostic services provision to respond to the Meek
decision. The Ohio program authorized these services to be administered by public employ-
ees off the premises of the nonpublic school. This was not objectionable on entanglement
grounds since any supervision would occur only in a neutral setting. The Court reasoned
that: "It can hardly be said that supervision of public employees performing public functions
on public property creates an excessive entanglement between church and state." Wolman,
433 U.S. at 248. Wolman's testing and scoring program similarly entailed no need for super-
vision since nonpublic school personnel could control neither the content nor the result of the
standardized tests.
56. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
57. Id at 661.
58. Id at 660.
59. Id at 646.
60. PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 3 (E. Gaffney ed. 1981).
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creased public support of private schools, congressmen and state legis-
lators will encounter difficult public policy questions. The impassioned
debate over public funding of private elementary and secondary educa-
tion centers upon claims and counterclaims of church/state separation,
racial and social class isolation, and academic elitism.
This section will analyze the four principle policy arguments in the
debate over public funding of private elementary and secondary
schools from both the proponents' and opponents' perspectives. The
first policy argument discusses whether parents of private school chil-
dren who directly support public education experience an unfair tax
burden. The second policy argument discusses whether private schools
perform a public function. The third policy argument discusses
whether private schools promote pluralism within student bodies or
whether they promote social, religious, and economical divisiveness.
The fourth policy argument discusses whether private schools provide a
better quality education than public schools.
When used in this section, the terms proponent and opponent will
include the following: A proponent of public funding of private ele-
mentary and secondary education believes that more students should
have the opportunity to attend private schools. This position may stem
from a belief that private schools offer an alternative to public educa-
tion or that elementary and secondary education should include reli-
gious training. An opponent believes that the federal and state
governments should not increase present levels of funding to private
elementary and secondary schools. This position may stem from a
strict interpretation of the constitutional mandate of separation of
church and state; a belief in the government's responsibility to only
provide an education for the masses; or the position may stem from an
elitist conviction that private elementary and secondary schools must
maintain small class size in order to offer students a quality education.
Do Private School Patrons Suffer an Unfair Tax Burden?
Local property taxes provide the largest source of funds for public
elementary and secondary education.6' Proponents of public funding
of private elementary and secondary education emphasize that all land
owners, including parents of children in private schools, must pay these
property taxes. Proponents of public aid to private education argue
that the mandatory property tax which supports public education
places an unfair and inequitable burden upon the parents of private
school children. This tax burden is compounded when little of this tax
money filters back to the private schools supported through tuition
payments.62
61. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW § 1300 et seq. (MCKINNEY 1981); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 122, § 17-2 et seq. (1962); CAL. REV. & TAX § 95 et seq. (West 1982 Supp.).
62. See discussion of the effects of tax credits, infra notes 96 to 122 and accompanying text.
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Opponents to public funding of private elementary and secondary
education respond to the unfair tax burden argument in two ways.
First, the taxpaying parents who send their children to private schools
make a voluntary choice not to send them to public schools. This
choice evidences the parents conscious decision not to take advantage
of the public education which they support through property taxes.
Second, opponents contend that taxpayers without school children also
support public education through their property tax dollars. In effect,
these taxpayers support a system from which they receive no direct
benefit.
The rationale underlying the proponents' position on the unfair tax
burden argument is that the payment of taxes should be directly pro-
portional to the receipt of public services supported by these taxes.
Conversely, the basic tenet underlying the opponents' position is that
the payment of taxes represents a payment for the public good and not
a payment for a specific government service. Opponents contend that
the commitment to public education has become a responsibility to be
shared by all citizens regardless of whether their children attend public
elementary or secondary school.
Should Private Schools be Compensated Because They Perform a Public
Function in Educating Citizens?
The United States Supreme Court has held that education is not a
fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution.63
State legislators, however, as a manifestation of the state's responsibil-
ity to provide an equal opportunity for all residents,' traditionally pro-
vide education subject to state regulation. Proponents of public
funding of private elementary and secondary education argue that
when private schools provide this service, they should be compensated
for their performance of a public function.
Opponents of public funding admit that private elementary and sec-
ondary schools perform a secular educational function but also empha-
size that private schools perform non-public and non-secular functions.
According to James Coleman's study, sixty-six percent of all private
elementary and secondary school students attend Catholic schools.65
The majority of private elementary and secondary students, therefore,
63. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court held that publicly financed primary and secondary education is not a
fundamental right. Thus, there appears to be no fundamental right by any student, public or
private, to receive an education.
64. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. J. COLEMAN, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHooLs 30 (1981) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN, 1981].
See also supra note 2 and accompanying text. Coleman's new study was commissioned and
financed by the National Center for Education Statistics, an arm of the Department of Edu-
cation. In the planning stages since 1978, the Center began a group-administered survey,
High School and Beyond (HS&B), in the spring of 1980 and will include follow-up surveys
of the same sample in 1982 and 1984. The survey includes 58,728 high school sophomores
and seniors in 1,016 schools, as well as their principals and teachers. When HS & B is corn-
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receive not only training in secular subjects but also religious instruc-
tion. While the Supreme Court appears to have recently lowered the
wall of separation between church and state,66 the practical problem of
distinguishing where secular subjects end and religious subjects begin
continues to cause unwillingness among state legislators to financially
support the educational services provided by private elementary and
secondary schools. 67  Opponents also note that the federal govern-
ment6 already offers ample financial assistance to private elementary
and secondary schools by providing textbooks in secular subjects, vis-
ual aid equipment, buses, and various secular teaching aids.
69
Proponents respond with the argument that, by reducing the
number of elementary and secondary students that public schools must
educate, private schools provide a public function which qualifies for
some type of compensation. Opponents rely upon David Sullivan's re-
search which indicates that no direct relationship exists between the
increase in the number of students in public schools and the total edu-
cational expenditures needed to accommodate this increase.70 Sullivan
concludes that an assimilation of private elementary and secondary
school students into public schools would not place a heavy burden on
public elementary and secondary schools.7 1 Opponents conclude that
the savings enjoyed by public schools when private schools provide an
alternative education is minimal. To support their view, opponents re-
fer to other institutions that perform public services and do not receive
direct public financial support. For example, organizations such as the
Boy Scouts of America contribute great public service to the develop-
ment of youth in a totally secular fashion but do not receive a govern-
ment subsidy.72
Finally, the opponents recognize that public funding would entail
extensive government regulation. Governments have a fiduciary re-
sponsibility to their taxpayers to account for use of government funds.73
Public funding would require governmental regulation to intrude into
the educational philosophy of each funded school, to dictate the secular
curriculum, and to control the distribution of public funds within the
pleted it will provide a wealth of information about schools, students, teachers, educational
policies and postsecondary outcomes.
Coleman's new report should be viewed from two distinct perspectives. One is political,
the other educational. The study seeks to examine the political question of the role of private
schools in U.S. education, and it also presents descriptive analysis of educational practices in
public and private high schools.
66. See supra notes 16 to 59 and accompanying text.
67. See Note, Education Vouchers and Tuition Tax Credits: In Search of Viable Public Aid to
Private Education, 10 J. LEGIS. 178, 191-96 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Viable Public 4id].
68. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended in 1978, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 236, 241, 331, 821, 1801 (1974). See supra note 3.
69. See supra notes 33 to 43 and accompanying text.
70. D. SULLIVAN, PUBLIC AID TO NoN-PUBLIC ScHooLs 63-67 (1974).
71. Id.




schools. Constitutional considerations aside, opponents and propo-
nents alike often find this entanglement unacceptable.
Do Private Schools Promote Pluralism or Divisiveness?
Proponents of public funding of private elementary and secondary
education claim that private schools maintain pluralism within the stu-
dent body. Private schools, they argue, reach beyond traditional school
district borders to select a balanced cross-section of the community
through their admissions program.74 To substantiate this claim, propo-
nents rely upon Coleman's study which concludes that private secon-
dary schools experience less racial segregation than public school
counterparts. 75 Coleman concedes, however, that overall, private sec-
ondary schools enroll a smaller proportion of blacks than do their pub-
lic school counterparts.
76
Opponents of public funding of private elementary and secondary
education also rely upon Coleman's study. Opponents contend that the
study documents private schools' contribution to religious segrega-
tion.77 Coleman's data reveals that sixty-six percent of all private ele-
mentary and secondary school students attend Catholic schools, and of
the students in Catholic schools, more than ninety percent are Catho-
lic. 78 Opponents claim that, while religious concentration does not
constitute an inherent evil, it certainly demonstrates that private ele-
mentary and secondary schools are not pluralistic in religious terms.
Proponents argue that public funding of private elementary and
secondary education will give more low-income students an opportu-
nity to attend private school. This will result, they argue, in a more
diverse student body. Opponents respond that a private school's ability
to engage in selective admissions enables it to discriminately accept
only those elements found "desirable." Such subjectivity, opponents
argue, inevitably results in some degree of elitism. Private elementary
and secondary schools will determine the student body based upon
such factors as a student's intellectual capacity, economic status, or so-
cial qualities. Opponents contend that by increasing the number of pri-
vate school applicants, private schools will be forced to draw sharper
lines of distinction for their admission standards.
Do Private Schools Provide a Higher Quality of Education than do Their
Public School Counterparts?
To examine the issue of quality, one must ask why parents are will-
ing to pay for an education which otherwise would be provided tuition-
free. The answer, according to private school proponents, lies in the
74. This is a right not enjoyed by public schools which are limited to school districting lines.






degree to which the public and private school services differ. Parents of
children in private elementary and secondary schools, from the least
expensive to the most expensive, sacrifice personal resources for their
vision of a quality differential. The subjective determination of what
constitutes "quality" makes the questions of whether or not private
schools provide a "better" education than their public school counter-
parts a difficult one to resolve. No "objective" criteria exist for deter-
mining what constitutes a "good" school or what creates a "better"
education. Quality decisions are necessarily subjective. While a vari-
ety of factors influence the private school patron's decision, in the final
analysis the chosen mode of education reflects a statement of values.
Proponents of public funding of private elementary and secondary
education suggest that private schools provide a higher quality educa-
tion due to a superior academic curriculum, higher academic demands
and expectations, and a disciplinary climate. They rely on James Cole-
man's report to support these contentions. According to Coleman, pri-
vate secondary schools generate higher achievement among students
than do public secondary schools.7 9 Coleman attributes this difference
to private secondary school student's "higher rates of engagement in
academic activities. School attendance is better, students do more
homework, and students generally take more rigorous subjects."" ° In
addition, Coleman concludes that the disciplinary climate of private
schools improves student achievement."'
Opponents, on the other hand, contend that the higher academic
achievements demonstrated by students in private schools stem from
two qualities unique to private elementary and secondary schools.
First, private elementary and secondary schools, unlike their public
school counterparts, generally use a selective admissions program. Sec-
ond, and related to the selective admissions program, private schools
can offer a variety of advanced academic courses.
Private elementary and secondary schools' ability to discriminately
select their enrollment, presumably based upon academic achievement
and entrance examinations, allows private schools to choose achievers.
Therefore, to the extent private elementary and secondary schools se-
lect achievers, this uncontrolled factor distorts conclusions which indi-
cate the educational superiority of private schools. Also, one cannot
disregard parental influence. The payment of tuition by parents of
children in private elementary and secondary schools instills greater
academic expectations in private school students.
Coleman also concludes that, when comparing students of similar
backgrounds, the enrollment in advanced academic courses "brings
79. Id at 152.
80. Id at 223. Coleman's original report, COLEMAN, 1966 supra note 2, at 21-23, concluded that
family background heavily determined educational achievement. Coleman's new report,
however, dramatically reverses this pessimistic conclusion and confirms the importance and
efficacy of private school educational policies.
81. COLEMAN, 1981 supra note 65, at 223.
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substantially greater achievement. 82 In sum, students learn more from
taking rigorous courses, a conclusion which contradicts the notion that
only high achievers elect to take rigorous courses. Opponents rely
upon Coleman's study to argue that the higher academic achievement
of private school students results from the advanced curricula fostered
in private schools. They note that, although public elementary and sec-
ondary schools provide advanced academic courses, the curricula of
public schools must reflect the wider spectrum of academic abilities.
Opponents contend that the advanced academic courses, which provide
private school students with a higher quality of education, would be
reduced if a broader range of students attended private elementary and
secondary schools.
These four policy considerations along with the constitutional re-
quirements provide the framework for analyzing various proposals for
public funding of private elementary and secondary education.
FEDERAL TUITION FUNDING PROPOSALS
Recent Federal Proposals
Historically, the federal government has assumed a limited role in
providing aid for elementary and secondary education. This policy
stems, in large part, from the federal Constitution's failure to expressly
provide for the education of United States citizens. Pursuant to the
power reserved in the states under the residuary clause of Amendment
X, state governments have assumed the responsibility of providing edu-
cation for citizens within state borders. The federal government has
intervened only when necessary to assure that these state programs pro-
vide a minimal level of equal opportunity to all students.
Federal involvement in elementary and secondary education pres-
ently consists of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as
amended, and the recently formed Department of Education. Though
primarily designed to assist public education, both forms of involve-
ment do provide federal aid to private schools at the elementary and
secondary level.
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,83 as
amended in 1978,84 (amended Act), allows local school districts with
concentrations of low-income families to obtain federal funding for
compensatory education programs.85 In compliance with Wheeler v.
Barrera,86 Title I of the amended Act requires that students attending
private schools, who qualify for compensatory education, receive the
82. Id
83. Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 236, 241a, 242, 331,
821, 1801 (1976)).
84. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-3389 (West Supp. 1982).
85. 20 U.S.C. § 241a (1976).
86. 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
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same funding as their public school counterparts.8 7 Title IV of the
amended Act contains a special provision for private schools with qual-
ifying students, allowing them to obtain federal funding even though
the encompassing school district does not meet the funding
requirements."8
The Department of Education, established in 1979,9 includes an
office to oversee education at the elementary and secondary level90 and
a separate office to supervise private education. 91 These offices admin-
ister indirect federal aid programs92 and determine federal policy for
private elementary and secondary education. Due to an increase in ed-
ucational costs and a growing disparity in the quality of educational
programs, this latter task has become a highly controversial issue.93
The surging cost of tuition at private elementary and secondary
schools has prompted parents, educators, lobbyists, and members of
Congress to call upon the federal government for assistance. The pro-
ponents of increased federal aid to private schools claim that the educa-
tional process, in which private schools participate, produces
intelligent, concerned citizens who benefit society. Because private
schools contribute this societal benefit, proponents argue that the fed-
eral government has a responsibility to provide assistance to private
education. 94 To further this argument, proponents emphasize the di-
versity and freedom of choice offered by private elementary and secon-
dary schools.
Proponents have embodied these ideals in two separate pieces of
legislation recently introduced into Congress. The first, tuition tax
credits, would afford parents of students attending private elementary
and secondary schools a tax credit for a portion of the tuition paid for
87. 20 U.S.C.A. § 2740 (West Supp. 1982) Subsection (b) allows the Commissioner to go beyond
equal funding and offer non-public students an opportunity to participate in the programs
provided for similarly deprived public students.
88. 20 U.S.C.A. § 3086 (West Supp. 1982). Pursuant to the amended act, Federal funds are
appropriated directly to school districts consisting of low income families. To qualify, 50%
of the families with school-aged children, within the school district, must be below the me-
dian income level for a family of four. Once a school district qualifies, the federal funds are
distributed to schools in proportion to the number of students in need of compensatory edu-
cation, as determined through testing. Pursuant to 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3801-3876 (West Supp.
1982), Congress established a supplemental elementary and secondary education block
grant, effective October 1, 1982.
89. Pub. L. 96-88, Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. 93 Stat. 668 (1979). 20
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (Cumin. Supp. 1980).
90. Congress established the office of Elementary and Secondary Education to administer func-
tions of both public and private schools. 20 U.S.C.A. § 3414 (West Supp. 1982).
91. Pursuant to the Department of Education Organization Act, supra note 89, the Office of
Private Education was given an assistant secretary status. For legislative history of the Act,
see 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1514.
92. The indirect programs include instructional materials, supplementary educational centers
and services, education of handicapped, bilingual education, and school nutrition. See 20
U.S.C. §§ 821, et seq. (1976).
93. Congressional awareness of the problem is evidenced by the Education Consolidation and
Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. V., § § 551-596, 95 Stat. 463-82 (1981) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
94. See supra notes 63 to 73 and accompanying text.
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each child. The second, Basic Education Opportunity Grants for ele-
mentary and secondary education ("Baby" BEOG's), would allow
qualifying parents to receive a grant from the federal government to
defray the cost of tuition and expenses. Because these proposals repre-
sent the most recent development in federal aid to private education,
this section will review the mechanics, analyze the constitutional issues,
and critique the policy of tuition tax credits and "Baby" BEOG's.
Tuition Tax Credits
Tuition tax credit proposals, sponsored by Senators Daniel P. Moy-
nihan (D-N.Y.) and Robert Packwood (R-Or.), have received the
greatest amount of congressional consideration over the past five years.
Although details change from year to year,95 the basic tuition tax credit
proposal allows parents of private elementary and secondary school
students to subtract a percentage of the tuition paid for private educa-
tion from their federal tax.96 The sponsors reason that a tax credit
would reduce the cost of private education thereby placing lower and
middle income parents in a financial position to choose their child's
education. Congress, however, has been influenced by the fact that a
substantial number of upper-middle and higher income parents, who
can already afford tuition payments, would also receive a tax credit.
In 1977, Senators Moynihan and Packwood, introduced a proposal
which would have allowed a tax credit limit to the lesser of fifty percent
of tuition or $500 per student.97 Even with a $500 per student limit,
Senator Moynihan estimated this proposal to cost $4.7 billion.98 The
tax credit would have applied to taxpayers who paid tuition at post-
secondary, vocational, secondary, and elementary schools. If the credit
exceeded the amount of tax liability, however, the taxpayer was to have
received a refund for the amount of the difference. This proposal,
which died in committee,99 laid the groundwork for a more refined pro-
posal the following year.
In 1978, the House of Representatives approved a non-refundable
tuition tax credit for parents of students attending private post-secon-
dary, vocational, secondary, and elementary schools.'0° The Senate Fi-
nance Committee approved the House version,101 but the Senate voted
95. The most notable changes include:
1) the amount of credit each parent is to receive;
2) whether parents whose tax liability is less than the amount of credit will receive a
refund.
96. Tax credits are subtracted from the actual tax owned. I.R.C. Part IV.
97. S. 2142, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. 30,831 (1977).
98. 123 CONG. REc. 30,832 (1977).
99. The bill was referred to the Senate Finance Committee.
100. The vote on H.R. 12050 was 237 to 158, 124 CONG. REc. 15,931 (1978). H.R. 12050 would
have allowed for a non-refundable credit, limited to 25% of tuition or $100 in year one, $150
in year two, and $250 in year three, 124 CONG. REc. 15,865 (1978).
101. Approved in August by the Senate Finance Committee by a vote of fifteen to one. See 124
CONG. REc. 24,412 (1978).
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to delete parents of elementary and secondary students from the recipi-
ent list.'0 In conference, the House rejected a Senate proposal to allow
tax credits only at the post-secondary and vocational level and the Sen-
ate rejected a House proposal that would include tuition tax credits at
the secondary level.'03 Congress' inability to reach a compromise re-
sulted in the eventual failure of this proposal. Senators Moynihan's
and Packwood's follow-up attempt to pass similar legislation in 1979
received no consideration from Congress."°
Encouraged by the Reagan Administration's support of public
funding for private education, 0 5 Senators Moynihan and Packwood
introduced another tuition tax credit proposal in 1981.106 The 1981
proposal provided for a refundable tax credit limited to the lesser of
fifty percent of tuition or $500 per student, until July 31, 1983, when the
limit would be increased to $1,000 per student. The Reagan Adminis-
tration recently introduced its own tuition tax credit proposal. 10 7 How-
ever, with current attention focused primarily on the economy, the
tuition tax credit proposals have become a secondary issue. 108
From a constitutional standpoint, Senator Moynihan's proposals
would apparently violate the establishment clause's prohibition under
the primary effect criterion.10 9 As the Court emphasized in Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education, Il0 such aid schemes constitute an im-
permissible advancement of religion "because the aid that will be de-
voted to secular functions is not identifiable and separable from aid to
sectarian activities.""' Moreover, by its nature tuition aid is capable of
diversion to religious uses. While government employees can adminis-
ter "services" on off-school sites,I" such separation and identification
of tuition aid appears impractical. Indeed, it would be futile to break
down the educational process into sectarian and secular activities, so as
102. By a vote of 56 to 41, the Senate voted in favor of Senator Hollings' (D-S.C.) amendment
that the bill apply only to post-secondary and vocational schools. 124 CONG. REC. 26,095
(1978). The Senate version of H.R. 12050 was then passed 65 to 27. 124 CONG. REc. 26,123
(1978).
103. 124 CONG. REc. 33,232 (1978). H. REP. No. 1682, 124 CONG. REC. 16,874 (1978); S. REP.
No. 1265, 124 CONG. REc. 33,068 (1978).
104. The bill, S. 1095, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), provided for a tax credit limited to 50% of
tuition or $100 at the elementary level and $500 at the secondary level. 125 CONG. REC.
S5500 (daily ed. May 8, 1979) (remarks by Sen. Moynihan).
105. Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1981, at 134, col. 2.
106. The bill, S. 550, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), provided for a tax credit limited to 50% of
tuition or $500 until July 31, 1983 when it becomes $1,000. 127 CONG. REc. S1505. (daily
ed. Feb. 24, 1981) (remarks by Sen. Moynihan).
107. S. 2673, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (introduced by Senators Dole (R-Kan.), Roth (R.-Del.),
and D'Amato (R-N.Y.), allows a family to take a credit for 50% of tuition. Maximum levels
would be $100 in 1983, $300 in 1984, $500 after 1985. Credits would be phased out for
income levels from $50,000 to $75,000.
108. The Reagan administration's proposed budget cuts would affect education from the elemen-
tary level, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1981, at A22, col. 1, to the guaranteed Student Loan
program at the post-secondary level, see NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 63.
109. See supra notes 33 to 43 and accompanying text.
110. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
111. Id at 480.
112. Wolman, 433 U.S. 229.
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to limit aid to the latter, since the Court has cogently recognized the
two remain "inextricably intertwined." ' The complexity of regula-
tions to promulgate such a policy and the government surveillance re-
quired to enforce them would most likely foster excessive government
entanglement. Finally, although arranging this aid at the taxation
rather than the appropriations end of the legislative fiscal process may
avoid the annual debate problem,11 4 these proposals still invite political
division along religious lines.'
15
The appropriateness of tuition tax credits for private schools must,
in addition to the constitutional considerations discussed, be examined
from the perspective of whether it represents sound public policy to
institute such a proposal. The tuition tax credit proposal will be ana-
lyzed within two public policy arguments: first, whether tuition tax
credits are economically divisive; and second, whether tuition tax cred-
its would diminish the purported superiority of private schools.
Proponents of tuition tax credits claim that such a proposal pro-
vides equal treatment for families at all socio-economic levels.116  A
non-refundable tax credit, as in the 1978 House proposal, would effec-
tively deny the intended full benefit of the credit to a family whose tax
liability amounts to less than the actual credit.1 ' In contrast, if the
credit is refundable, as in the 1981 Senate proposal, the government
would, in effect, pay parents with low tax liabilities to send their chil-
dren to a private school.1 8 In either case, the tuition tax credit would
foster economic divisiveness by allowing high-income families, who
could afford tuition payments without a credit, to recoup a substantial
sum of money.11 9
113. See supra note 36.
114. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623. After observing the aid in question presented "successive and
very likely permanent annual appropriations," the Court stated, "[t]he potential for political
divisiveness related to religious belief and practice is aggravated. . . by the need for contin-
uing annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and
populations grow."
115. In defense of federal tuition tax credit bills, at least one commentator has contended that
Congress, by virtue of its federal character, is entitled to greater deference from the Court
than a state legislature is in constitutional challenges to statutes. See Scalia, On Making it
Look Easy by Doing it Wrong: A Critical View of the Justice Department, in PrvATE
SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 173 (E. Gaffney ed. 1981). However, Professor Scalia is
unable to cite any authority for this proposition. Instead, he relies on a similar theory in the
equal protection area which he concedes is based on the Federal Government's exclusive
power over foreign affairs, immigration, and naturalization. No such justification is present
in the establishment clause area. Indeed, the establishment clause reads "Congress shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. 1. Not
until 1940 was this prohibition first applied against a state. If anything Congress has a higher
standard of scrutiny.
116. Tax credits are subtracted from the actual tax owed. I.R.C. Part IV (1976). Tax deductions
must be itemized and are subtracted from the adjusted gross income only if itemized deduc-
tions exceed the zero bracket amount I.R.C. § 63 (1976).
117. The credit would only amount to the actual tax imposed, if less than the credit.
118. If the proposal contained a refund, then the taxpayer with a tax less than the credit would
receive from the federal government the difference between the tax and the amount of the
credit.
119. Granting a tax credit to families who can already afford tuition payments would draw funds
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Tuition tax credits will increase the cost of tuition at private ele-
mentary and secondary schools. The tax credit proposals invite private
schools to increase tuition to a level which will afford these schools the
greatest amount of capital, and taxpaying parents the greatest available
credit. Increasing tuition, however, means that before parents can take
advantage of tuition tax credits, they must have the capital available to
pay an increased tuition. If parents are unable to meet the increased
costs, the tuition tax credit proposal would effectively deny lower and
middle income families access to private schools.
1 20
The second policy argument against adopting tuition tax credits
maintains that these credits would diminish the quality of education at
private schools, thereby reducing the choices in the type of education
available. 121 Tuition tax credits would result in an increase in the
number of students financially able to attend private schools. An in-
crease in the student population of private elementary and secondary
schools would result in larger classes and an increase in the student-
teacher ratio; a curriculum to provide for a wider academic range of
students with particular emphasis on providing for the special needs of
some students; and an increase in the number of teachers.
In his report, James Coleman concludes that the individualized at-
tention and the advanced curriculum offered by private schools consti-
tute the significant factors of a quality education.1 22 An erosion of
these factors would result in a uniformity of education among public
and private schools. Such a uniformity would effectively reduce par-
ents' opportunity to choose the type of education for their children.
The opportunity to choose the school and the education, cited as a sig-
nificant value to proponents of public funding of private education,
would then be meaningless.
"Baby" BEOG's
In addition to tuition tax credit proposals, Senator Moynihan has
formulated a Basic Education Opportunity Grant for elementary and
secondary education ("Baby" BEOG's). This proposal would simply
extend the BEOG's presently provided at the post-secondary level1 4 to
the elementary and secondary levels. The amount of family contribu-
from the federal budget. This action, without a simultaneous cut in expenditures, would
contradict congressional intent to balance the budget. See 31 U.S.C. § 27 (West Supp. 1982).
120. The parents must first have funds available tc pay the tuition before they qualify for the
credit.
121. There are a percentage of parents who would send their children to private schools for reli-
gious purposes.
122. COLEMAN, 1981, supra note 65, at 224-25.
123. The bill, S.1101, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) was introduced May 9, 1979. 125 CONG. REC.
S5595 (daily ed. May 9, 1979) (remarks by Sen. Moynihan). Baby BEOG's would be an
amendment to the BEOG provision contained within the Higher Education Act of 1965. See
20 U.S.C. § 1070a (1976).
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (1976). The BEOG program was reauthorized in 1980 as the Pell Grant
program. Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367 (1980).
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tion would be calculated by a predetermined BEOG formula and sub-
tracted from a maximum amount of "eligible" costs.1 25 The "Baby"
BEOG proposal, unlike tuition tax credits, would aid only needy fami-
lies and not those already able to afford tuition payments at private
elementary and secondary schools.' 26 Congress, however, has been in-
fluenced by the fact that "Baby" BEOG's would draw funds from the
fixed account appropriated for post-secondary BEOG's.
127
In 1979, Senator Moynihan introduced a proposal which allowed
federal grants of up to $1,800 per student at the elementary and secon-
dary level.'2 ' In contrast to tax credit proposals, which applied only to
tuition, this "Baby" BEOG proposal applied to tuition and expenses.129
Parents would have qualified for the grant by filling out extensive
forms, similar to those now required for post-secondary BEOG's.
1 30
This proposal, which died in committee, set the stage for a heated pol-
icy debate the following year.
In 1980, during Congress' consideration of a bill to extend the
Higher Education Act of 1965, Senator Moynihan introduced a propo-
sal to include elementary and secondary students in the BEOG pro-
gram. '31 Under this proposal, the "eligible" costs of attending an
elementary or secondary school could not exceed $1,500 and the maxi-
mum grant could not exceed $750.t32 Additionally, if the grant yielded
by the formula did not exceed $100, no grant would be made. In a
lengthy floor debate, Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) argued that
"Baby" BEOG's, cloaked in language of aid to the poor, represented
the least intrusive means of increasing federal aid to private elementary
and secondary education. 33 Once passed, this "foot in the door legisla-
tion"'t 34 would provide a foundation for introducing the more expan-
125. For the various ways in which grant allotments are calculated, see 34 C.F.R. pt. 690, subpt. F
(1981).
126. Senator Moynihan claims that of the 1.2 million students who would benefit from this pro-
gram, 234,000 are Black or Hispanic. 126 CONG. REc. S7840 (daily ed. June 23, 1980) (re-
marks by Sen. Moynihan).
127. 125 CONG. REC. S5595 (daily ed. May 9, 1979).
128. As amended by the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978, the basic grants program
covers students from families with a maximum income of $25,000. 125 CONG. REc. S5595
(daily ed. May 9, 1979) (remarks by Sen. Moynihan).
129. Id at S5596.
130. The form must include those items listed in 20 U.S.C. § 1070b-2 (1978).
131. 126 CONG. REc. S7840 (daily ed. June 23, 1980) (remarks by Sen. Moynihan). The amend-
ment 1914 was defeated 7 to 5 in Committee. 126 CONG. REC. S7965 (daily ed. June 24,
1980) (remarks by Sen. Moynihan).
132. A formula is used to determine the amount of family contribution from those families with
an income up to $25,000. This contribution is then subtracted from $1,500 and the difference
is the amount of the grant. This formula is subject to three limitations:
(I) The grant cannot exceed one-half the cost of attendance ($750);
(2) Family contribution plus grant cannot exceed the cost of attendance;
(3) If the grant is less than $100, no grant will be made. "
126 CONG. REC. S7840 (daily ed. June 23, 1980) (remarks by Sen. Moynihan). In calculating
the formula, the factors considered include family's income, cost of attendance, family size,
the number of students for whom tuition is being paid.
133. 126 CONG. Rc. S7840 (daily ed. June 23, 1980) (remarks by Sen. Hollings).
134. According to Senator Hollings, "although this legislation would offer limited assistance to a
relatively small number of students, it would establish a precedent for comprehensive Fed-
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sive program of tuition tax credits. The Senate heeded Senator
Hollings admonition and defeated the "Baby" BEOG amendment to
the Higher Education Act of 1967.135
From a legal viewpoint, these proposals generally entail the same
constitutional flaws as the tuition tax credit proposals.1 36 Without re-
stating these points entirely, let it suffice to say that even under the
most lenient application of the establishment clause's tripartite test
these proposals have the primary effect of advancing religion.
The appropriateness of tuition tax credits for private schools must
in addition to the constitutional problems, be examined from the per-
spective of whether it represents sound public policy to institute such a
proposal. The "Baby" BEOG proposal will be analyzed within two
arguments: first, whether the "Baby" BEOG program would be eco-
nomically divisive; and second, the impact that the "Baby" BEOG pro-
gram will have on the BEOG program already instituted at the post-
secondary level.
As discussed in the public policy critiques of tuition tax credits,
"Baby" BEOG's would increase tuition at private elementary and sec-
ondary schools. Because the proposal provides, as a minimum, a half
tuition grant, private schools would be more inclined to raise tuition
knowing that "Baby" BEOG recipients would only have to pay half the
cost. Attempting to capture additional revenue, private schools could
easily continue to increase their tuition. Increased tuition would, in
turn, require additional grant money for a program already projected
to cost $149 million in 1980.137
The "Baby" BEOG program will have a severe impact upon the
present BEOG program now offered at the post-secondary level. The
"Baby" BEOG proposal, as designed, would drain funds from the pres-
ent BEOG program without increasing the BEOG budget.' 38  The
grants available to students at the post-secondary level will either be
diminished in amount or be available to a smaller number of students.
According to Congressional statistics, only one percent of the students
presently enrolled in elementary and secondary schools would qualify
for "Baby" BEOG grants.139 In effect, the "Baby" BEOG would have
a noticeable impact on the present BEOG program, while only benefit-
ing a limited number of parents with children at the elementary and
secondary levels.
Considering the potential for government intermeddling, the strains
on the quality of private education, and the denial of admission to the
eral assistance to private education." 126 CONG. REc. S7850 (daily ed. June 23, 1980) (re-
marks by Sen. Hollings).
135. The vote on amendment 1914 was 71-24. 126 CONG. REc. S7974 (daily ed. June 24, 1980).
136. Supra notes 109 to 115 and accompanying text.
137. 126 CONG. REc. S7843 (daily ed. June 24, 1980)
138. Id This is five percent of the projected $2.9 billion budget for BEOG's.
139. Id at S7848. For this reason, the Department of Education opposes Baby BEOG's. See 126
CONG. REc. S7970 (daily ed. June 24, 1980).
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very students that federal aid is designed to assist, tuition tax credits
and "Baby" BEOG's represent poor federal policy. Aside from the
constitutional implications of these proposals, an increase in federal aid
to private education will widen the gap between "haves" and "have
nots." A tax credit which results in increased tuition costs and stricter
admissions standards will effectively deny access to those who cannot
afford the pre-credit costs or meet the admission requirements. "Baby"
BEOG's will greatly affect the present BEOG program while only qui-
eting a small percentage of the parents who cry educational inequality.
Once the federal government expands the scope of "Baby" BEOG's,
increased tuition costs and stricter admission standards will be the only
means of controlling increasing admissions demands. The net effect of
both proposals will be to widen the gap between the "haves" who can
afford pre-credit costs and meet strict admission requirements and the
"have nots" who will continue to complain of educational inequality.
STATE TUITION FUNDING PROPOSALS
Several state legislative initiatives parallel the recent Federal pro-
posals aimed at reducing private school parents' tuition burden. As the
case law history examined previously indicates, successful state aid
schemes have provided bus transportation, 140 secular textbooks,
14 '
"auxiliary services", 42 and testing and scoring services.1 43 In the wake
of their most recent successes, state aid proponents have now decided
to focus their energies on the heart of the public funding issue-tuition.
This section will test these recent state initiatives which have taken two
general courses: tuition tax benefits and tuition voucher plans.
Tuition Tax Benefits
Proposed tax relief programs for parents with students in private
elementary and secondary schools can generally include credits and de-
ductions.144 The tax credit programs, of course, offer the most direct
relief to the taxpayer in that the legislatively determined amount of the
credit is subtracted, dollar for dollar, from a parent's state income tax
liability. 45  By contrast, under a tax deduction program, a parent's
gross income is reduced by the allowable amount before computing the
tax liability. 46
140. Everson, 330 U.S. 1. See also Annot., 41 A.L.R. 3d 344 (1972).
141. 411en, 392 U.S. 236; Annot., 93 A.L.R. 2d 986 (1964).
142. Meek, 421 U.S. 349.
143. Wolman, 433 U.S. 229; Jegan, 444 U.S. 646.
144. See generally Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, which demonstrates the difficulty, at times, of distin-
guishing tax credits and tax deductions. In Nyquist, New York termed its tax relief program
for private school expenses a deduction, but the Supreme Court construed it to be a tax
credit.
145. For example, if a taxpayer's income is $25,000, and the state income tax on that amount is
$1,200, if the state allowed parents with children in private schools a $300 credit, the parents'
tax liability to the state is reduced to $900.
146. For example, the taxpayer with $25,000 in income, and a $500 allowable deduction will have
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Two tuition tax benefit programs have drawn considerable public
attention in recent months: a Minnesota statute allowing a deduction
for private education expenses and a tuition 147 tax credit initiative in
Washington, D.C.
Minnesota Deduction Statute. Minnesota has the longest standing
state statute allowing tax deductions for private school expenses. 148 The
Minnesota deduction statute, 149 first enacted in 1955, allows parents of
private school students to deduct amounts paid toward tuition, text-
books, and transportation from their taxable income. The statute al-
lows deductions up to $500 for each dependent in kindergarten through
sixth grade, and up to $700 for each dependent in grades seven through
twelve.'5 ° The statute includes deductions for expenses incurred in
sending children to public schools. However, parents with children in
private schools remain the primary beneficiaries of the statute.
Parents may also claim the deduction if their children attend school
out of state, though the statute applies only in states contiguous with
Minnesota."' Further, the statute requires that the schools attended
must not discriminate on racial grounds, and that the costs of religious
materials are not deductible. The state loses an estimated two million
dollars a year in revenues because of these deductions.152
The Minnesota deduction statute is currently undergoing its second
constitutional challenge in four years.'53 In the first challenge, a Min-
a taxable income of $24,500. If the state income tax rate is five percent on both $25,000 and
$24,500, the parents would see an actual savings, as a result of the education deduction, of
only $25. Also, if the state requires itemized deductions to reach a certain amount before any
deductions are allowed, parents with a small amount of deductions might reap no benefits
from the allowable deduction.
147. The District of Columbia proposal would allow a credit for all educational expenses, notjust
tuition. However, tax credit for private school tuition is the primary purpose of the initiative.
148. Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1981, at BI.
149. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09(22) (West 1982):
[The following amounts are deductible from gross income:]
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to
exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in
grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attend-
ing an elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the
state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which ad-
heres to the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this
subdivision, "textbooks" shall mean and include books and other instructional mater-
ials and equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in teaching only those
subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary schools in
this state and shall not include instructional books and materials used in the teaching
of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, nor shall it include such books or materials
for, or transportation to, extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical
or dramatic events, speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar
nature.
150. Id
151. North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and Wisconsin.
152. Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1981, at B21.
153. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978), and Mueller
v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981), af'd 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
51 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982) (No. 82-195).
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nesota district court found that the statute passed establishment clause
muster.1 54 In the second challenge to the statute both the district court
and Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the statute.155
In the period between the first and second challenge to the Minne-
sota statute, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
found a virtually identical Rhode Island deduction statute 56 in viola-
tion of the establishment clause. 157 The First Circuit held that the "pri-
mary effect" of the Rhode Island statute was to confer a benefit on
parents who send their children to private religious schools. 158 To sup-
port this conclusion, the First Circuit relied on facts found by the dis-
trict court indicating that ninety-four percent of the private school
students in Rhode Island attend religious schools. 59
This decision, invalidating the Rhode Island statute, appeared to
suggest the Minnesota statute also violated the establishment clause.
The Eighth Circuit nevertheless rejected the First Circuit's reasoning
and upheld the Minnesota statute. 160  In support of its decision the
Eighth Circuit noted: (1) that the Minnesota statute is neutral on its
face; 161 (2) that it does not have the primary effect of benefitting only
parents of private school students since it allows deductions for public
school expenses as well; 162 and (3) that the Supreme Court has explic-
itly reserved judgment on the constitutionality of deductions.1 63 The
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the Eight
Circuit decision.'"
A tax deduction differs from a tax credit in that a deduction reduces
154. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978).
155. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981), a 'd 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3253 (1982) (No. 82-195).
156. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980) provided:
The following amounts are deductible from gross income:
[A]mounts paid to others, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each de-
pendent in kindergarten through sixth (6th) grade and seven hundred dollars ($700)
for each dependent in grades seven (7) through twelve (12) inclusive, for tuition, text-
books, and transportation of each such dependent attending an elementary or secon-
dary school situated in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New
Hampshire or Maine, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's
compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to
the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As used in this section, "textbooks"
shall mean and include books and other instructional materials and equipment used
in elementary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and com-
monly taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not
include instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doc-
trines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or
worship.
157. Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Nolberg, 630 F.2d 855 (1980).
158. See id at 858-61.
159. See id at 859.
160. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1201 (8th Cir. 1982).
161. See id at 1204.
162. See id at 1205.
163. See id at 1199. In Nyqulst, 413 U.S. 756, the Supreme Court found tax credits for private
school expenses unconstitutional, but it explicitly reserved judgment on deductions. 413 U.S.
at 790, n.49.
164. 51 U.S.L.W. 3253 (1982).
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taxable income, while a credit reduces tax paid. 165 Because a deduction
reduces the pre-tax amount rather than the actual tax amount, a deduc-
tion results in less savings to the taxpayer.166 Despite this minor differ-
ence, the same policy arguments which applied to tuition tax credits 67
would apply to the tuition tax deduction proposal.
Washington, D. C. Tax Credit Initiative. The Washington, D.C. Ini-
tiative of 1981,168 represents the tax credit initiative Washington, D.C.
165. Unlike the federal income tax system which requires that a taxpayer have a certain level of
deductions before he may use them, I.R.C. § 63 (1976), many state income tax systems allow
any deduction to be taken from taxable income. A credit is subtracted from the actual tax
owed.
166. A deduction basically reduces the amount of taxable income which is subject to tax. A credit
reduces the tax due. For example:
(1) Gross income 10,000
Deduction 500
Taxable Income 9,500
1983 Federal Tax Rate $504 plus 15% of the excess over $7,600
Amount Due $ 789
(2) Taxable Income 10,000
1983 Federal Tax Rate $504 plus 15% of the excess over $7,600
Pre-credit anmt. due 900
Credit 500
Amount Due $ 400
167. Supra notes 116 to 122 and accompanying text.
168. Washington, D.C. Initiative Measure No. 7, Title VIII A Educational Tax Credit, for the
November 3, 1981 general election. The initiative provided as follows:
Title VIII A Educational Tax Credit
See. l(a) GENERAL RULE.-For the purpose of providing better and expanded
educational opportunities for children and to improve the quality and efficiency of all
schools, public and private, there shall be allowed to every taxpayer a credit against
the tax imposed by this Act for the taxable year an amount equal to the qualified
educational expenses incurred or actually paid during the applicable taxable year.
(b) MAXIMUM CREDIT PER PUPIL.-For taxable years ending on or before
December 31, 1982, the maximum dollar amount allowable to the taxpayer as a tax
credit for qualified educational expenses incurred or actually paid shall not exceed
$1,200 for each eligible pupil. This maximum dollar amount shall be increased by ten
percent of the previous year's maximum for each taxable year;, provided, however,
that the Council of the District of Columbia may each year specify a smaller or larger
percentage increase upon a finding by two-thirds of all members elected to the Coun-
cil of the District of Columbia that such percentage increase is equal to the rate of
inflation for the preceding calendar year.
(c) MAXIMUM CREDIT PER INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYER.-In the case of
an individual taxpayer, the maximum dollar amount allowable as tax credits for qual-
ified educational expenses incurred or actually paid for all pupils supported shall not
exceed the amount of income tax payable for the taxable year.
(d) MAXIMUM CREDIT FOR OTHER TAXPAYERS.-In the case of a part-
nership, association, corporation, unincorporated business or any other taxpayer not
an individual taxpayer, the maximum dollar amount allowable as tax credits for qual-
ified educational expenses incurred or paid for all pupils shall not exceed 50% of the
income or franchise tax payable for the taxable year.
Sec. 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS
For purposes of this tide:
(a) The term "educational institution" shall mean any institution, public or pri-
vate, providing instruction at the kindergarten, elementary school, junior high school,
or high school level, enrollment at which constitutes compliance with the Compulsory
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officials placed on the November 1981 ballot. The initiative became
the subject of wide public debate before being overwhelmingly rejected
by the electorate.1 69  Operation of the initiative would have allowed
any taxpayer, including businesses and corporations, to pay tuition and
educational expenses for children in private schools and to claim a de-
School Attendance Law of the District of Columbia, and which maintains racially
non-discriminatory policies as required by law.
(b) The term "eligible pupil" shall mean any District of Columbia resident who
is enrolled on a full-time basis in an educational institution.
(c) The words "fiscal year" mean an accounting period of twelve months ending
on the last day of any month other than December.
(d) The term "income and franchise taxes" means any taxes imposed upon a
taxpayer pursuant to this Act, or similar taxes upon income of the taxpayer, regardless
of the authority for their enactment.
(e) The word "individual" means all natural persons, whether married or un-
married.
(f) The word "person" means an individual, a partnership (other than an unin-
corporated business), an association, an unincorporated business, and a corporation.
(g) The term "qualified educational expenses" means sums paid by a taxpayer
on behalf of eliible pupils for tuition and other educational fees actually charged by
educational institutions in which such pupils are enrolled, and for incidental expenses
incurred for and in connection with attendance by the eligible pupils in such institu-
tions. For other than individual taxpayers, educational expenses must qualify in ac-
cordance with the requirements of Section 2(g) and be provided directly or indirectly
to pupils who demonstrate financial need in accordance with standards which shall be
enacted by the Council of the District of Columbia.
(h) The words "taxable year" mean the calendar year or the fiscal year upon the
basis of which the net income of the taxpayer is computed under this Act; if no fiscal
year has been established by the taxpayer, the taxpayer has elected the calendar year.
The phrase "taxable year" includes, in the case of a return made for a fractional part
of a calendar or fiscal year, under the provisions of this Act or under regulations
prescribed by the Mayor, the period for which such return is made.
(i) The word "taxpayer" means .any person required by this Act to pay a tax or
file a return or report in the District of Columbia.
See. 3. STANDARDS FOR PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION.
Private institutions shall be presumed to meet the minimum standards required by
law concerning instruction, quality of education, ethics, health and safety, and fiscal
responsibility, provided the instruction, quality of education, ethics, health and safety,
and fiscal responsibility are substantially equivalent to the standard maintained in
public schools in the District of Columbia.
Sec. 4. TAX CREDIT NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS GOVERNMENT
ASSISTANCE TO INSTITUTION.
No educational institution shall, on account of enrolling an eligible pupil for
whom a tax credit is claimed under this title, be considered a recipient of government
financial assistance for the purpose of imposing any legal rule, guideline, order, re-
quirement, or regulation upon such institution or for any other purpose.
Sec. 5. SEVERABILITY AND SAVINGS.
The provisions of this measure are severable, and if any provision, sentence,
clause, section or part is held illegal, invalid, unconstitutional or inapplicable to any
person or circumstances, such illegality, invalidity, unconstitutionality or inapplicabil-
ity shall not affect or impair any of the remaining provisions, sentences, clauses, sec-
tions or parts of the act or their application. Any act, statute or law inconsistent with
the provisions of this measure is hereby repealed to the extent of such inconsistency.
Sec. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This measure shall become effective in accordance with Section 5 of Public Law
95-526, Sec. 1(3), amending the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amend-
ment Act of 1977 (D.C. Law 2-46), and Section 602(c) of the District of Columbia
Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act," and shall apply to quali-
fied educational expenses incurred or actually paid on or after January 1, 1982.
169. Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1981, at B1. The initiative was soundly defeated with 73,829 vot-
ing against and 8,904 in favor-an 8 to 1 margin.
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duction up to $1,200 per child. 170 Businesses and corporations, how-
ever, could have claimed tax credits for expenditures only up to fifty
percent of their total tax liability.
171
It is difficult to surmise the possible effect this initiative would have
had on the Washington, D.C. public school system and the city's tax
revenues. According to proponents, the measure would have actually
saved money for the District of Columbia. 172 These savings, however,
would have only occurred if eight percent of the students in public
schools transferred to private schools. 17  An eight percent transfer of
public school students, however, would have increased private school
population by fifty percent. 74 The proponents presumed that new
schools would be started as the demand for private schools in-
creased. 75 Even accepting these questionable assumptions, the D.C.
public school system would certainly have suffered a loss of revenues
during the intervening years.
A family of four in the District of Columbia would have had to
make at least $21,500 a year to owe $1,200 in D.C. income taxes, and
thereby be in a position to take full advantage of the $1,200 educational
credit.176 According to the initiative's proponents, low income families
without sufficient tax liability to take advantage of the allowable credit
could still have gained access to the private schools through the tax
deductible donations of businesses and other individuals. 177 Propo-
nents err, however, in believing this plan offered an incentive for non-
parent taxpayers to make such tax deductible donations for the benefit
of poor children. While such donation would reduce, dollar for dollar,
the taxpayers' D.C. tax liability, 17 they would also increase taxpayers'
federal income tax since the federal deductions for local taxes would be
lost. Non-parent taxpayers thus would have ended up paying more in
federal taxes if they made the donation. The prospect of the poor bene-
fitting from this proposal seems, at best, slight. In light of the negative
response this initiative received at the D.C. polls in November 1981, it
is doubtful it will be a model for the states.
Tuition Voucher Plans
Educational vouchers represent a second form that state legislative
initiatives have taken to aid in the financing of private school tuition.
Various researchers have proposed many types of voucher plans in the
170. Initiative Measure No. 7, § l(b), supra note 168.
171. Id § 1(d).
172. West,.4n Analysis of the District of Columbia Tax Credit Initiative, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY
ANALYSIS, Oct. 27, 1981, at 10.
173. Id at 13.
174. Id at 14.
175. Id at 3.
176. Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1981, at C3.
177. Id
178. The nonparent taxpayer's out-of-pocket payment is the same, but is merely redirected from
the government to the private school.
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past twenty years, but none of these plans have as yet been imple-
mented.17 9 The leading advocates of educational vouchers at this time
are John Coons and Stephen Sugarman, professors of law at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley. Professors Coons and Sugarman have
developed proposals for a legislative bill1 80 and a state constitutional
amendment 8' aimed at creating a system of educational vouchers in
California. The voucher bills failed to gain much popular support in
the state legislature, and the initiative to amend the state constitution
has not yet been placed on the state ballot.
The proposed constitutional amendment would radically change
California's method of school financing. Under the amendment, the
California state government would totally support California schools,
thus eliminating local funding based on property taxes.18 2  The new
educational program would establish three types of schools supported
by the state: public schools, public scholarship schools, and private
scholarship schools.' The public schools would not redeem vouchers
but would essentially be a traditional public school, except that all
funding would come directly from the state rather than local property
taxes.' 84 The public and private scholarship schools, however, would
receive vouchers as their sole source of income.'
85
179. But ef Alum Rock Union School District, Transition Model Voucher Proposal, Office of
Economic Opportunity, April 12, 1972. The Alum Rock school district in San Jose, Califor-
nia ran an experimental voucher program solely with public schools for a few years in the
early seventies.
180. Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System for Vouchers, 59
CAL. L. REV. 321 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice].
181. COONS & SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 1978.
The authors' proposal for an amendment to the California Constitution as found in this
book, failed to receive enough ratifying signatures to be included on the June 1980 Califor-
nia ballot [hereinafter cited as CooNs & SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE].
182. Coons and Sugarman were counsel for the appellant in Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3rd 728, 557
P.2d 929 (1976). Serrano was a landmark decision by the California Supreme Court which
found the discrepancies in educational opportunities, as a result of local property tax fund-
ing, unconstitutional under the California Constitution.
183. COONS & SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE, supra note 181, at 225. Family Choice Edu-
cation Initiative:
5b. Denitions
Three classes of common schools for grades kindergarten through twelve are
hereby established, namely public schools, public scholarship schools, and private
scholarship schools. Public schools are those publicly owned, funded, and adminis-
tered and not certified to redeem scholarships. Public scholarship schools are those
publicly owned and administered and certified under this section to redeem scholar-
ships provided to children of school age. Private scholarship schools are those pri-
vately owned and administered and certified to redeem scholarships provided to
children of school age.
184. Id
185. Id at 227-28.
5i. Scholarships
Every child of school age is entitled to a scholarship redeemable only for educa-
tion in public and private scholarship schools. Scholarships shall be in an amount
adequate for a thorough education and equal for every child of similar grade level
and circumstance. Each scholarship shall be augmented by the cost of the transporta-
tion required by section 5c. The redeemable amount may also differ by pupil age,
curriculum, bilingualism, special needs, variations in local cost, need to encourage
integrated schools, and other circumstances deemed appropriate by the Legislature.
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The educational voucher program would entitle every resident child
in the state to a state-issued voucher.18 6 These vouchers would be re-
deemed only at the public and private scholarship schools. 8 7 The
scholarship schools would then turn these vouchers in to the state for
direct financial reimbursement."I For each voucher redeemed by the
state, the scholarship schools would receive an amount equivalent to
ninety percent of the average per pupil cost at public schools.'8 9
Participating schools, however, would be greatly restricted in their
receipt of income from sources other than vouchers, thus barring one
school from gaining a monetary advantage over another school.' 9 Ac-
Where pupils transfer during a school year, an appropriate division shall be made of
the scholarship.
The Legislature shall authorize parents to purchase supplementary scholarships
from the state within such limitis as it deems appropriate. The price charged for such
supplementary scholarships shall reflect the family's capacit to ay and the number
of its school age children, so that families making equivalent financial effort shall
receive supplementary scholarships of equal value for all their school age children.
The price of supplementary scholarships may be less than or exceed their redeemable
value. Other than scholarships and supplementary scholarships provided for herein
public and private scholarship schools shall accept no consideration, charge, or fee,
and public and private scholarship schools requiring a supplementary scholarship for
admission shall require the same of all pupils.
186. Id
187. Id
188. Id at 226.
5e. Regulation of Scholarsho Schools
The Superintendent shall certify public and private schools entitled to redeem
scholarships. He shall certify any applicant public or private school which meets the
curricular standards imposed by law upon private schools on July 1, 1979, so long as
such public or private school is in compliance with this section, neither advocates
unlawful behavior nor discriminates unlawfully in hiring, and discloses annually the
qualifications of its teachers and its financial condition in such detail regarding the
extent and deployment of its resources as the Legislature deems helpful to an in-
formed judgment by parents concerning the education provided. The Legislature
may also require standardized testing and the disclosure of results therefrom to the
extent it determines that such information discloses differences in quality of instruc-
tion apart from the characteristics of the children instructed.
Private scholarship schools shall be organized as California corporations; they
shall determine the qualifications of their own teachers except that the Legislature
may require a baccalaureate degree or its equivalent for full time teaching employees.
No school shall be ineligible to redeem scholarships because it teaches moral values,
philosophy, or religion, but religion may not be taught in public schools or public
scholarship schools. The Legislature shall encourage diversity and experimentation
in content, style, and environment of education. The Legislature shall establish
health and safety standards applicable to public and private scholarship schools; such
standards shall promote prompt approval of diverse facilities and shall not be more
restrictive than the standards imposed upon facilities of private schools on July 1,
1979.
189. Id at 228-29.
5L Average Cost Per Scholarsho Pupil
The average public cost per scholarship pupil shall approximate ninety percent of
the average public cost in the same year of similar pupils enrolled in public schools,
and scholarships shall be adjusted accordingly. Public cost here and in section 5m
shall mean and include every direct and indirect cost to the public of education in the
relevant year whether that cost is current, deferred, or pro-rated. It shall include the
costs of providing, maintaining, and replacing facilities; at the discretion of the Legis-
lature it may include the costs of teacher retirement.
190. Id. at 228:
5k. Assistancefrom Non-State Sources
The Legislature may regulate private grants to public and private scholarship
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cording to Coons and Sugarman, the laudable goals of the educational
voucher plan191 include an attempt to remove "the influence of house-
hold income on the quality of educational opportunity and [to offer]
notably greater freedom of choice in the selection of educational pro-
grams . ". .., The voucher program would also insure that scholar-
ship schools receive the same per pupil funding.193 Parents, therefore,
could send their children to any scholarship school they wanted, and all
schools would compete for the same pupil "market." Supporters of the
voucher plan contend that competition for students would challenge
schools to be innovative and be more fiscally responsible.
9 4
The Coons and Sugarman voucher program would also allow par-
ents to choose to enroll their children in any scholarship school, subject
only to the schools right to set a maximum enrollment.195 If a particu-
lar scholarship school became overscribed, then applicants would be
chosen by lot. 196 Applicants with brothers and sisters in a certain
school would also be given priority in enrollment. 1
97
Under the Coons and Sugarman proposal, the California legislature
would restrict scholarship schools in their religious instruction. 98 They
would allow these schools to teach religion and to hold religious activi-
ties. However, the schools could not compel students to participate in
religious rituals. 199 Similar to other private schools, religious schools,
schools and shall ensure that Federal aid, within the limits of Federal law, advances
the objectives of this Article.
191. Id at 225.
5a. Purpose
It is the purpose of the people hereby to enlarge parental control over the educa-
tion of children; to make every pupil eligible for a scholarship redeemable in certified
schools; to assure that public spending for a child's education may not be a function
of wealth; to empower families, regardless of income, to choose among common
schools on an equal basis; to assure that thereby the state aids no institution, religious
or secular, to protect freedom of religion but aid no religion; to protect pupils from
unfair discipline or dismissal; to control spending by limits and competition; to in-
crease the variety of schools, improve their quality, and promote their racial
integration.
192. Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice, supra note 180, at 324.
193. COONS & SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE, supra note 181.
194. Id. at 160.
195. Id at 225.
5c. Admissions and Transportation
Parents or guardians may enroll their children of school age in any public or pri-
vate scholarship school subject to the right of every such school to set its total capacity
and to limit applications to children of either sex. Where applications to any public
or private scholarship school exceed capacity the Superintendent of Public Instruction
shall regulate selection among applicants by lot. However, pupils who, after July 1,
1981, are enrolled in and attend any school which is or becomes a public or private
scholarship school shall have priority therein. Siblings of pupils with priority shall
enjoy similar priority. With reasonable notice a child may be transferred during the
school year from any common school to any public or private scholarship school with
space. Public and private scholarship schools shall transport pupils within minimum
and maximum distances fixed by the Superintendent of Public Instruction according






under the voucher program requirements, would have to give up some
of the independence they enjoy today to participate in the voucher pro-
gram. Of course, these private schools could choose not to participate
in the voucher program if they find the open admissions requirements
and restrictions on religious education too high a price to pay for
vouchers.
Whether the voucher plans will withstand a challenge under the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment remains questionable.
The Supreme Court has drawn fine lines in deciding what types of state
aid to private elementary and secondary schools are permissible. The
Court has invalidated state programs to reimburse schools for teacher
salaries,2" to maintain and repair school buildings, 0 1 to provide in-
structional materials, 02 and to reimburse parents for tuition ex-
penses.20 3 Because the voucher plans would accomplish these very
functions, the plans, as presently drafted, appear constitutionally
impermissible.
From a policy standpoint, vouchers deserve serious public consider-
ation. The three factors which favor implementation of a voucher sys-
tem include: elimination of the inequitable local property tax as the
main source of elementary and secondary school financing; increased
competition for students which would challenge schools to be innova-
tive and more fiscally responsible; and a greater freedom of choice for
parents as to what schools their children will attend.
The main policy consideration against implementation of a voucher
system, other than its probable unconstitutionality,2°4 is a lack of tested
data. One can only project the impact that a voucher system will have
upon racial and economic integration within elementary and secondary
schools. Before adopting a voucher system, researchers must conduct
isolated experiments to answer some of these serious questions. 0 5
CONCLUSION
At federal and state levels of government, proponents of public
funding for private elementary and secondary schools have begun to
focus their efforts on legislative tuition aid proposals. The initial in-
quiry in assessing federal and state proposals is, of course, their consti-
tutionality under the establishment clause. As the Supreme Court has
interpreted this prohibition in state aid cases, a three part test has
evolved which considers the legislative purpose, the primary effect, and
any government entanglement of the challenged statute. Although the
200. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
201. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756.
202. Wvolman, 433 U.S. 229; Meek, 421 U.S. 349.
203. Sloan, 413 U.S. 825.
204. See supra text accompanying text to notes 16 to 59; Viable PublicAid, supra note 67, at 191-
96.
205. See supra note 176; Viable PublicAid, .pra note 67, at 180-85.
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latter two aspects of this test remain vital, the Court has been tending to
give ground in recent cases. Nevertheless, even under the least restric-
tive application of the Establishment test tuition aid appears
unconstitutional.
Constitutional considerations aside, equally important policy mat-
ters are presented in public funding proposals. These include argu-
ments that private schools (1) are unfairly denied property tax revenues
paid by parents of private school children; (2) promote pluralism,
rather than diversity; (3) serve a public function; and (4) provide a bet-
ter education than their public counterparts. Critical analysis reveals,
however, that public funds ought better be directed to improving the
existing public elementary and secondary schools, rather than adopting
the private schools as wards of the state.
Neither constitutional nor policy concerns support the specific tui-
tion aid proposals based on tax benefits of the federal and state level.
Legally, the absence of any provision to limit funding to the secular
activities of sectarian schools runs headlong into the primary effect pro-
hibition of the establishment clause. Moreover, solely as a matter of
public policy these tax benefit schemes would widen the gap between
"haves" who itemize deductions, can afford pre-credit costs, and meet
strict admission standards and the have-nots who will continue to com-
plain of educational inequality.
The Coons and Sugarman voucher proposal, which disassociates
the funding of elementary and secondary education from local property
tax, appears to promote educational opportunity and freedom of
choice. From a constitutional perspective, however, the voucher pro-
posal fails to adequately address its establishment clause implications.
As with the tax based tuition aid proposals, unconditionally funding
tuition through a voucher by its nature impermissibly advances the
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